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CURRENT DECISIONS
used were "validated," in part, by their relationship to necessary job
sklls.29
The Griggs case gives the first useful judicial interpretation of what
tests may or may not legally be used in a merit system scheme of pro-
motion. Section 703 (h) may be violated even when no intent to dis-
criminate on a racial basis is shown.30 If the educational requirement
or aptitude test is not shown to be related to necessary job skills, and
if it results in discrimination against blacks, it is unlawful.3s This hold-
ing gives judicial support to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's guideline on the subject,32 and requires that employers be
prepared to demonstrate the relevance of the tests to the qualifications
for the job for which they are required. This is particularly true if
proportionately more whites than blacks meet the requirements. From
the tenor of the opinion, it is fair to predict that the Griggs rationale
will be extended to pre-employment tests when such a case arises.
NATALIE C. GILLETTE
Criminal Law-ExPLOITATION OF ILLEGAL ARREST. United States v.
Edmonds, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
After making a lawful arrest, FBI agents were assaulted by an
angry mob and forced to let their prisoner escape. The following day
other agents who had not been involved in the affray arrested four
defendants on the pretext of failure to have Selective Service cards in
their possession. 1 Defendants Were then escorted to FBI headquarters
in the hope that they could be identified by the victims of the assault.
.The ensuing identification resulted in courtroom identification testi-
29. Id. at 78. The court found that the tests were validated as plaintiff argued they
must be, by the company officials' evaluation and a showing that they were job-related.
ld.- at 76, 78. The court also said the tests need not be validated anyhow, since
plaintiff had not shown a discriminatory result. Id. at 77. The injunction sought
,against the use'of the tests was denied. Id. at 119.
30. 91 S. Ct. at 853.
31. -d. at 856.
32. § 1607.4(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 12333 (1970) demands that employers keep "data
demonstrating that the test is predictive of . . . important elements of work behavior
... relevant to the job...
1. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 462(b) (6) (1968). Testimony
showed that the government, had never prosecuted for inadvertent failure to have
draft cards on an individual's person, and subsequent actions, at FBI headquarters in-
dicated they never intended to prosecute in this instance. United States v. Edmonds, 432
F.2d 557, 582 (2d Cir. 1970).
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mony and conviction for impeding a lawful arrest,2 aiding in an
escape,8 and assault.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the defendants contended that the identification testimony
should have been excluded as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. The gov-
ernment argued that the testimony was admissible since it was derived
from a source independent of the arrest 4 The court of appeals, how-
ever, determined that the arrests were a deliberate pretext for purposes
of securing in-court testimony and, therefore, a violation of the fourth
amendment.5 In reversing the convictions, the court concluded that
where the government purposefully exploits the fruits of an illegal
arrest, evidence derived therefrom must be excluded in order to serve
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.8
In 1886, the exclusionary rule was first applied in Boyd v. United
States7 when the Supreme Court rejected the common law rule8 of
admissibility in federal courts and held that evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment could not be used against an accusedY In
Weeks v. United States' ° the Court explicitly stated what had been
implied in Boyd; the protection given by the fourth amendment would
2. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1964).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 752(b) (1964).
4. 432 F.2d at 582.
5. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.
US. CoNsr. amend. IV.
Illegality vel non was not an issue since the Government had conceded that the arrest
was illegal. 432 F.2d at 581.
6. See notes 7-20 inf ra, and accompanying text.
7. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8. See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43
Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841).
9. The basis of the exclusionary rule was also predicated upon the fifth amendment
and its intimate relationship to the fourth amendment.
[The] "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man
to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in
the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a
wimess against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment,
throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
116 U.S. at 633. See also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
10. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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be meaningless if evidence seized as a result of an illegal search and
seizure was admitted at trial.1 The rule was justified on the basis that
no other practical means was sufficient to enforce constitutional rights
or to deter illegal police methods.12 From this foundation, the rule has
been expanded into a vast and controversiaP3 area of constitutional law
which requires the exclusion of evidence secured by illegal arrests,14
lineups, 5 detentions,' 6 entries,'17 interrogations, 8 wiretappings,' and
confessions. 20
In Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States,2' where the "fruits
of the poisonous tree" doctrine was first enunciated, the Supreme Court
postulated that in addition to illegally secured evidence any knowledge
derived from that evidence should be excluded.22 The Court was care-
ful to point out, however, that knowledge gained legally from an in-
dependent source was admissible.as Nardone v. United States24 formu-
lated a test to distinguish derivative evidence from evidence secured
from an independent source. Borrowing from the proximate cause con-
cept in the law of torts,2 5 the Court suggested that derivative evidence
would be independent of the "poisonous tree" when the causal con-
nection became "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 26 Applying
11. The Court also pointed out that illegal police activities "should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution... . Id. at 392.
12. See, e.g., Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
J. LANDYNsKi, S.ARcH AND SEIZUz AN THE SuPREA= Couzr 13-16 (1966); Piter, "The
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALiF. L. REV. 579 (1968).
13. See, e.g., J. LANDi NsK, supra note 12, at 84-86.
14. Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Taglavore v.
United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961).
15. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
16. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
17. Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966).
19. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
22. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, reasoned that to allow the govern-
ment to benefit from its own wrong "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of
words." Id. at 392.
23. Id.
24. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
25. See, e.g., Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: A Fresh Appraisal of the
Civil Liberties Involved in Wiretapping and Its Derivative Use, 37 ILL. L. REv. 99, 106
(1942).
26. 308 U.S. at 341.
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this test in Costello v. United States,27 for example, the Supreme Court
refused to exclude a voluntary confession made after illegal wiretap-
ping had prompted the petitioner's appearance before a grand jury.28
The proximate cause test was clarified in Wong Sun v. United
States 9 where the Court required exclusion only if the derivative evi-
dence was obtained by exploiting the primary illegality.
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree"
simply because it would not have come to light but for the il-
legal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such
a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegal-
ity, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 30
In United States v. Wade3' the Supreme Court remanded the case
with directions to apply Wong Sun to determine the effect of an un-
constitutional lineup on subsequent in-court identification testimony.
The Court indicated that if the testimony was predicated upon an
illegal lineup it must be excluded, but if a definite image of the accused
was independently formed in the mind of the witness, the testimony
would be admissible 2
United States v. Edmonds3 did not present merely a question of
evidence derived from an illegal police activity.34 If that had been
the sole issue, an application of Wade would have permitted the admis-
sion of the testimony on the basis that the identification at FBI head-
quarters was not relied upon to bolster the agents' image of the de-
fendants0 5 The objection in Edmonds was directed at the exploitation
of evidence derived from an illegal arrest rather than at the use of
otherwise reliable testimony.3 The court felt that exclusion of the
identification testimony was compelled by the deterrent purpose of the
27. 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
28. Id. at 280.
29. 371 U.S.471 (1963).
30. Id. at 487-88, quoting from MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959).
31. 388 U.S. 218, 241-43 (1967).
32. Id. at 239-42.
33. 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
34. Id. at 583.
35. Id. at 582.
36. Id. at 584.
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exclusionary rule3 7 and that any other result would permit unconsti-
tutional dragnet arrests simply for the purpose of holding a lineup.3
This decision is a logical extension of the rule promulgated in Wong
Sun and will not preclude the use of identification testimony resulting
from an arrest made in good faith which turns out to have been illegal
because of a lack of probable cause.39 Patently, exclusion of such evi-
dence would not serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.40
The decision, however, will preclude the use of evidence secured by
an arrest for the very purpose of exhibiting a prisoner before the vic-
tim with the intent of having a resulting identification duplicated at trial.
Such an arrest is a violation of the fourth amendment,41 and the use
of the evidence derived from it is as much an exploitation of the "pri-
mary illegality" as where a defendant is arrested without probable
cause in the expectation that a search will yield evidence, and the
illegally seized evidence is introduced at trial.42
WOODRow TURNER, JR.
Evidence-PRIvILEED COMMuNICATIONS-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE IN STOCKHOLDERS' SUIT. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. March 23, 1971).
Stockholders of the First American Life Insurance Company brought
a class action against the corporation and its officers alleging violations
of federal and state securities laws and common law fraud. The cor-
37. Id. The court, further, felt they would be required to exclude the testimony as
an exercise of their supervisory power. 432 F.2d at 585. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 13 (1968); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J,
dissenting); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
38. 432 F.2d at 584 n.7, quoting from Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study
in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 535 (1963).
39. Id. at 584.
40. One commentator has suggested that the following question should be asked to
determine whether the exclusionary rule applies.
What goals do policemen have in mind in acting in this improper way?
What unexpected fruits . .. could or should be expected of the impropriety,
according to our experience? Is the exclusionary rule invoked in this case
calculated to deter such impropriety? Will, in fact, exclusion in this case
help to serve the policy ends of the rule?
Ruffin, Out On a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 32, 38 (1967).
41. See note 5 supra.
42. 432 F.2d at 584.
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